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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PRICHARD TRANSFER, INC., 
Plaintiff and AppellantJ 
-vs.-
w. S. HATCH CO., a Utah corporation; 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH; DONALD HACKING, 
HAL S. BENNETT and DONALD T. 
ADAMS, Commissioners of said 
Commission, 
Def end ants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
10761 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant and respondent, W. S. Hatch Co., (here-
inafter sometimes ref erred to as "Hatch") agrees with 
plaintiff's statement of facts with two exceptions. Prichard 
states "no new evidence was tendered or received" at the 
August 16 hearing. While it is true that no reporter was 
present, evidence was introduced by both parties as to 
the results of their efforts to work together in an attempt 
lo reduce operating costs and correspondingly reduce rates 
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pursuant to the Commision's order of July 6, 1966. Such 
fact was affirmatively found by the Commission in its 
order of August 25, 1966 ( R. 119) . 
As part of its statement of facts, appellant concludes 
"Prichard's evidence demonstrates that the diversion of 
this sulphuric acid haul will require it to close down its 
~1oab terminal and will adversely affect its operations" 
(p. 7). Hatch denies that the granting of the application 
will have any such results. This matter will be developed 
in the argument under point VI. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
HATCH ADEQUATELY PROVED THAT PUB-
LIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY REQUIRE ' 
THE GRANTING OF THE APPLICATION. 
POINT II 
THE EXISTING SERVICE OF PRICHARD IS 
NOT ADEQUATE. 
POINT III 
ECONOMIES TO THE SHIPPER ARE A PROP-
ER ELEMENT OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND. 
NECESSITY. 
Prichard's brief contains nine points. Argument of 
these points is broken down into three categories. Po~nts 
I II III and IV are covered in the first category; pomts 
V, VI and VII in the second; and points VIII and IX in 
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the third. Respondent's points I, II and III are in answer 
to appellant's first grouping. Point IV is in answer to ap-
pellant's points V, VI and VII and respondent's points 
V and VI are in answer to appellant's points VIII and 
IX. 
The first portion of appellant's arguments presents but 
a single question to the court. Is the Commission com-
pelled by law to protect Prichard's monopolistic one-way 
haul at an annual cost to the shipping public of $68,-
500.00? 
Prichard has a complete monopoly on the authority 
to transport sulphuric acid from Mexican Hat to Moab 
(R. 62, 63). 
This court has repeatedly held that it will not substi-
tute its judgment for that of the Commission if there is 
sufficient evidence to support the Commission's findings. 
Rudy v. Public Service Commission, et al, 1 Utah 2d 223, 
265 P. 2d 400, Mulcahy v. Public Service Commission, 
101 Utah 245, 117 P. 2d 298, Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. 
Public Service Commission, et al, 13 Utah 2d 72, 368 P. 
2d 590. Therefore, unless the Commission is compelled 
by law to protect the one-way service of Prichard under 
the circumstances existing in this case, the Commission's 
order must be affirmed. 
Section 54-6-5, U.C.A. provides in part 
"Before granting a certificate to a common ~otor 
carrier the Commission shall take into considera-
tion **'*** the existing transportation facilities in 
the territory proposed to be served". 
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The statute does not provide, as appellant contends, 
that the existing monopoly must be protected regardless 
of the consequences to the public. In the case of Union 
Pacific Railroad Company, et al v. Public Service Com-
miission, et al, 103 Utah 459, 135 P. 2d 915, this Court, 
in construing the above quoted statute, held: 
"The discretionary power granted the Commission 
by the act, to grant or withhold certificates, nega-
tives the idea that it was intended to grant and 
maintain a monopoly in any field. The fact that 
the act provides that the Commission may grant a 
certificate when it determines that public conven-
ience and necessity requires such services recog-
nizes that regulated competition is as much within 
the provisions of the act as is regulated monopoly. 
In the exercise of its powers to grant or withhold 
certificate of convenience and necessity, questions , 
of impairment of vested or property rights cannot 
very well arise. No one can have a vested right to 
be free from competition, to have a monopoly 
against the public." 
In Lakeshore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Bennett, et 
al, 8 Utah 2d 293, 333 P. 2d 1061, this Court held: 
"The Public Service Commission is charged with 
the duty of seeing that the public receives the most 
efficient and economical service possible. This re· 
quires consideration of all aspects of the public's 
interest. ***** and existing carriers, although ren· 
dering good service, may not be sufficient for the 
existing business or its potential." 
An examination of the service provided by Prichard 
will show that it does not adequately or satisfactorily 
serve the shipper's reasonable needs. 
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The supporting shipper requested Hatch to file this 
appplication with the Public Service Commission author-
izing the northbound movement of sulphuric acid and 
also requested Prichard to file an application with the 
Interstate Commerce Commission authorizing transpor-
tation of sulphur southbound from the rail head near 
Potash to Mexican Hat (R. 32, 33). This was done in 
order to have two carriers available to provide an efficient 
operation in place of the inefficient, cumbersome and ex-
pensive service being provided by the same two carriers 
on separate one-way movements at the present time. The 
new rate was discussed with both Prichard and Hatch 
( R. 40) . Prichard himself had quoted the new sulphuric 
acid rate of $2.90 a ton which could thus be put into 
effect, compared to the present rate of $5.60 (R. 63, 64). 
Prichard admitted that he couldn't reduce the existing 
$5.60 per ton rate to anywhere near $2.90 without author-
ity to perform a two-way haul ( R. 64). Nevertheless, 
Prichard refused to file an application with the Inter-
state Commerce Commission for authority to transport 
sulphur southbound ( R. 63). Having had full opportun-
ity to obtain authority which would enable him to provide 
a parallel and sufficient service with that proposed by 
Hatch and having refused such opportunity, he now 
takes the position that the shipper must use his ineffi-
cient one-way service regardless of the economic conse-
quences. 
We admit that under ordinary circumstances rates are 
not a proper subject of inquiry in an application for a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity. This is for 
the obvious reason that shippers would support the ap-
plication of any carrier who would promise a lower rate 
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regardless of the adequacy of the existing service. How-
e:er, this case presents an unusual situation as was recog-
mzed by the Commission in its August 25, 1966 order (R. 
119): 
"W~ile the applicant Hatch provide satisfactory 
service on the southbound transportation of molten 
sulphur and the protestant Prichard provides satis-
factory transportation on the northbound move-
ment of sulphuric acid, there is no existing service 
available which can be performed by one carrier 
in the same vehicle which is necessary to effect the 
economies herein mentioned" ( R. 118) . 
The present transportation cost to the Atlas Mineral 
Corporation using the inefficient services of both Hatch 
and Prichard is $159,720 annually (R. 39) which can be 
reduced by 43 percent, or $68,500 per year, if this appli-
cation is granted ( R. 43). Certainly the "consideration of ' 
existing transportation facilities" required by the statute 
does not compel the Commission to perpetuate such an 
enormous inefficiency. Furthermore, the shipper testified 
that if an efficient and adequate two-way service could 
not be provided for him he would be forced to buy his 
own equipment and perform both services in private car· 
riage ( R. 43). Here we have a situation in which the 
supporting shipper does not want to be in the transpor· 
tation business (R. 43) and for that reason requested both 
Prichard and Hatch to provide an efficient and economic 
service which it desperately needs in order to enable it 
to continue to use common carriers. 
The cost of the two inefficient one-way hauls is so high 
that continued use thereof is prohibited. Prichard refusfrl 
to attempt to provide an efficient two-way service and 
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preferred to sit back and prevent Hatch from providing 
such service in the hope that he can somehow force the 
shipper to continue to waste $68,500 a year. Of course, 
his attempts will be unsuccessful. Even if the Hatch ap-
plication is denied, he will lose the haul to the private 
transportation of the shipper. In such event Hatch would, 
of course, also lose the southbound sulphur haul. Cer-
tainly it is not sound economic regulation for the Com-
mission to force a shipper to enter private carriage against 
his will and take business away from two common car-
riers, one of whom is attempting to provide an efficient 
and economic service. 
We take offense to appellant's charge that Hatch is 
"chiseling" rates to get new business. The proposed rates 
were discussed with both Hatch and Prichard by the ship-
per and Prichard was given equal opportunity to obtain 
two-way authority. 
The services provided by Prichard are not satisfactory. 
The Commission cannot in the exercise of its functions 
put on "blinders" and look at mere segments of the overall 
service proposed. It must look at the entire transporta-
tion problem and see that common carriers do provide, to 
the best of their ability, a sound, economic and adequate 
service. 
The fact that the continued well-being of existing car-
riers is taken into account does not mean that once a 
carrier is granted a franchise it acquires an inviolable and 
exclusive right to render a public service merely because 
it meets its own standard of adequacy. See Lake shore Mo-
lor Coach Lines v. Welling, et al, 9 Utah 2d 114, 339 P. 
'Yrl 1011. 
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POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE FULLY JUSTIFIES THE COM-
MISSION'S ORDER OF AUGUST 25, 1966. 
In the second portion of its argument the appellant 
contends that the Commission acted in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner in reversing its order of July 12, 1966 
based upon what it chooses to call "a round table discus-
sion". 
The Commission's initial order of July 12, 1966 was 
by its very terms a conditional order. The Commission 
denied the application and ordered: 
"That W. S. Hatch Co. and Prichard Transfer, 
Inc. jointly and in combination, make and employ 
every legal means of reducing operating costs and 
correspondingly reduce the rates on the transpor-
tation of molten sulphur from Potash to Mexican 
Hat, and sulphuric acid from Mexican Hat to 
Moab, as those movements and transportation 
services are set out and described in the findings 
in this case, and that these carriers report to the 
Commission on their accomplishments in this re· 
gard" (R. 109, 110). 
There can be no question about the conditional na· 
ture of the order inasmuch as both parties were ordered 
to report back to the Commission after attempting to work 
out a joint arrangement whereby the rates could be re· 
duced. 
Hatch filed a timely petition for rehearing (R. 112) 
pursuant to which the Commission gave notice of oral 
argument and in said notice specifically provided that the 
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hearing was for the purpose of having the parties report 
on their joint efforts. The hearing notice provided, in 
part: 
"The purpose of the hearing to which this notice 
applies is to allow the W. S. Hatch Co. and Prich-
ard Transfer, Inc. to report to the Commission on 
the results of their joint efforts to attempt to re-
duce operating costs and correspondingly reduce 
the rates above-mentioned; to hear argument on 
the W. S. Hatch Co. petition for rehearing and 
reconsideration, and to give the parties an oppor-
tunity to introduce additional evidence, if they de-
sire" (R. 114). 
Hearing pursuant to said notice was had on July 12, 1966. 
There was no "round table discussion" as indicated by 
appellant. Both the appellant and respondent through 
their respective counsel agreed that it would be unneces-
sary to have a reporter. However, evidence was intro-
duced by both parties concerning their attempt to reduce 
rates on a joint basis and both parties advised the Com-
mission that although they had made every effort in good 
faith to effect such economies it could not be done in the 
absence of additional operating authority. 
Section 54-7-15, Utah Code Annotated 1953, sets 
forth the mechanical procedure for an appeal. It provides 
m part: 
"No cause of action arising out of any order or 
decision of the Commission shall accrue in any 
court to any corporation or person unless .sue? cor-
poration or person shall ha"'.e made application. to 
the Commission for a reheanng before the effective 
date of such order or decision,*****. If, after such 
rehearing and consideration of all the facts in-
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eluding those arising since the making of the order 
or decision, the Commission shall be of the opinion 
that the original order or decision or any part 
thereof, is in any respect unjust and unwarranted 
or should be changed, the Commission may abro-
gate, change or modify the same." 
The statute does not provide for a trial de novo. It 
merely provides the machinery by which a dissatisfied 
party may urge the Commission to reconsider its actions 
and sets forth the procedural steps necessary to effect an 
appeal to this Court. 
At the rehearing the parties did introduce evidence 
as found by the Commission in its order of August 25 (R. 
118) as to their inability to make a joint rate reduction. 
Based upon this report and upon the arguments presented 
by counsel the Commission reversed its conditional order 
of July 12. Such action is fully supported and justified by ' 
the evidence. 
POINT V 
THE COMMISSION DID NOT ERR IN DENY· 
ING PRICHARD'S PETITION FOR REHEARING. 
POINT VI 
GRANTING OF THE HATCH APPLICATION 
WILL NOT RESULT IN A DIVERSION OF TRAF· · 
FIC FROM PRICHARD. 
Appellant apparently lays great stress on the fact t~at 
the Commission reversed its prior order. There is nothmg 
unusual about this. However, in the instant case it was 
not a reversal as such because the original order of July 
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12, 1966 was conditioned upon the ability of the carriers 
to work together. After finding that they could not, the 
Commission under the circumstances then confronting it, 
granted the Hatch application and subsequently denied 
Prichard's petition for rehearing. 
Prichard contends that the granting of the application 
will result in the wrongful diversion of traffic which it 
now enjoys and will consequently have an adverse affect 
upon its operations. 
As heretofore stated, the evidence is uncontroverted 
that if an efficient two-way service such as that proposed 
by Hatch is not made available to the shipper it will take 
all the traffic involved from both Prichard and Hatch and 
perform the service in its ovvn equipment (R. 43). There-
fore, the action of the Commission has no bearing what-
ever upon Prichard's ability to retain the traffic. The exist-
ing rates are not realistic and Prichard will lose the traffic 
for this reason even if the application is denied. 
The Commission properly granted the application and 
thereby provided the shipper an economic and efficient 
service which it does not have at the present time. This is 
the only action the Commission could take to keep the 
traftic under regulation and allow certificated common 
carriers to perform the service under its watchful eye and 
jurisdiction, rather than blindly deny the application and 
have the traffic move to private carriage. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent Hatch respectfully submits that the or-
ckr of the Public Service Commission is fully justified by 
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the evidence. In no other way can an efficient and eco-
nomic transportation service be made available to the 
shipping public. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARK K. BOYLE 
Attorney for Defendant and Respondent 
W. S. Hatch Co. 
345 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General of Utah 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendant 
Public Service Commission 
